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AN OUTSIDER'S VIEW ON CHINA'S INSIDER TRADING
LAW
Charles Zhen Qut
Abstract: China's insider trading law can be found in the country's first unified
securities industry law, Securities Law of the People's Republic of China, which came
into force on July 1, 1999. The provisions of this law relating to insider trading,
however, do not seem to help achieve the legislative purpose of the Securities Law,
namely, to protect the interest of investors and promote the development of a socialist
economy. The inadequacy of the current regime lies in the overly narrow definitions of
"insider" and "inside information," the lack of workability of civil liability provisions,
and the failure of China's Securities Regulatory Commission to use its interpretive
powers. This Article argues that these problems can be solved by adopting Australia's
approach to insider trading regulation, which is based upon a person's ability to access
non-public material information.
I. INTRODUCTION
An effective financial market is essential to China's successful
transition from the old planned economy to a market orientated economy. It
is also vital to China's successful integration into the world market and the
World Trade Organization ("WTO"). To ensure the efficacy and integrity of
its financial market, China enacted its first unified securities legislation, the
Securities Law of the People's Republic of China ("Securities Law").1 The
Securities Law was drafted with guidance from the United States,2 and was
enacted on December 29, 1998. The purpose of the new law is to
standardize the issuing and trading of securities, to protect the lawful rights
and interests of investors, to safeguard the social and economic order and
public interests, and to promote the development of the socialist market
economy.3
This Article examines the likely efficacy of the insider trading
provisions introduced under the Securities Law and considers possible
options to improve its workability, including the adoption of Australia's
t B.A., East China Normal University (1984); Graduate Diploma in Information Management,
University of New South Wales (1990), LL.B. University of New South Whales (1990); GDLP, The
College of Law (New South Wales) (1998); S.J.D. candidate University of New South Wales; Associate
Lecturer, Griffith University Faculty of Law.
1 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhengquanfa [Security Law of the People's Republic of China]
(promulgated Dec. 29, 1998, effective July 1, 1999) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter Securities Law].
2 Minkang Gu & Robert C. Art, Securitization of State Ownership: Chinese Securities Law, 18
MICH. J. INT'L L. 115, 117 (1996).
Securities Law, supra note 1, art. 1.
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insider trading law. Australia's insider trading regime is based on a person's
ability to access non-public material information. This is distinguishable
from U.S.-originated fiduciary duty and misappropriation theories, which are
both based on common law fiduciary principles . This Article concludes
that it would be easier for Chinese lawyers to adopt a legal approach that is
not based on common law equity doctrines. Part II considers the policy
justifications for regulating insider trading activities in China. Part III traces
the development of China's current capital markets and insider trading law.
Part IV examines the efficacy of the insider trading provisions under the
Securities Law, and Part V suggests possible options to remedy inadequate
provisions in the current regime.
II. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PROHIBITING INSIDER TRADING ACTIVITIES IN
CHINA
Insider trading has been defined as "trading by a trader who possesses
information that is 'material' to the price of the securities which are traded,
[and] which is not already known to other traders in the market.",5 In other
words, insider trading refers to trading activities by a person who possesses
non-public information that will affect the price of the securities in question.
Such information can be classified as "good news" or "bad news." For
example, a person possessing non-public information regarding a pending
hostile takeover commits insider trading by purchasing shares of the target
company before, and selling the shares after, the public announcement of the
takeover is made. The information traded on in this example is "good
news," since hostile takeovers typically raise the share price of target
companies.6 However, an insider, meaning an individual in possession of
material, non-public information about a company, can also trade on "bad
news." An insider who sells shares prior to the release of news about poor
corporate earnings or about the defection of a key employee to a competitor
is said to have traded on "bad news," because such information can
negatively impact the price of the given stock.7
4 See Michael Gething, Insider trading Enforcement: Where Are We Now and Where Do We Go
From Here?, 16 COMPANY & SECURITIES L. J. 607, 608-09 (1998).
5 Ashley Black, The Reform of Insider Trading Law in Australia 15(1) UNiv. N.S.W. L. J. 214, 214
(1992).
6 For example, in United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997), a lawyer who traded securities on
non-public information about a pending takeover by one of his law firm's corporate clients was convicted
of insider trading.
7 The release of"bad news" can have a dramatic impact on the price of a stock. For example, AXA
Asia-Pacific's shares fell more that five percent on August 17, 2000 in response to an announcement
concerning the defection of key financial planning agents from the company's Hong Kong operation to a
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It is necessary to prohibit insider trading activities in China for two
practical reasons. First, in order to attract foreign investment, China must
make overseas investors feel confident about the integrity of China's
financial market. Insider trading is often associated with other forms of
abusive trading activities, such as market manipulation and short selling.
Potential investors will likely lose interest in China's financial market if it is
riddled with activities that hurt investor's interests and are prohibited in
other financial markets. Second, insider trading activities cause actual
financial damage to the Chinese securities market. Potential victims of an
insider trading racket span the entire breadth of the market and such
widespread loss can damage the market as a whole.8 For these reasons,
insider trading should be prohibited in China.
A. Insider Trading and Investment from Overseas
China's economic reform, especially the reform of the state-owned
sector, depends on the availability of liquid capital.9 With China's imminent
entry into the WTO, China will be able to attract investment from overseas,
as the country's financial markets will be open to foreign investors. A
financial market riddled with fraud, real or perceived, such as insider trading
and market manipulation will deter investors from countries where there is a
higher degree of market integrity. China's entry into the WTO is
conditioned upon implementing a broad range of market-opening reforms.' 0
The fact that WTO members imposed such a condition demonstrates the
extent of overseas investors' concern about market integrity in China.
Failing to prohibit insider trading will dissolve foreign investors' confidence
in the integrity of China's financial markets and limit the market's ability to
attract investment from overseas.
company competitor. Sean Aylmer, Axa Shares Tumble After Hong Kong Agents Defect to Competitor
AUSTL. FIN. REV., Aug. 18, 2000, at 59.8 For example, during the 1980s, Dennis Levine and Ivan Boesky were two of the most notorious
inside traders on Wall Street. They both made their fortune by relying almost exclusively on insider
information provided by an extensive network of informants. See JAMES B. STEWART, DENS OF THIEVES
68-94 (1991); FENTON BAILEY, THE JUNK BOND REVOLUTION: THE USA, UK AND JAPAN 132-46 (1992).
The damage done to the securities market can be gauged by the $100 million Boesky was ordered to return.
MICHAEL MORAN, THE POLITICS OF THE FINANCIAL SERVICES REVOLUTION 47 (1991).9 F. Dong, Developing Capital Markets and Reforming State-Owned Enterprises, in THE THEORY
AND PRACTICE OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA'S CAPITAL MARKETS 109 (Y. Li et al. ed., 1998).
10 Michael Dwyer, China Speeds up Plans to Open Markets to Foreigners, AUSTL. FIN. REV., June
28, 2000, available at 2000 WL 20845282.
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B. Insider Trading and Other Forms ofAbusive Trading Activities
Insider trading is often associated with market manipulation. Market
manipulation refers to practices "designed to stimulate artificially market
turnover and share prices for the purpose of profiting, at the general public's
expense, from the distortions inflicted on the market.""1 Market
manipulators typically trade inside information to create artificial market
turnovers and false share prices.
Market manipulation is particularly prevalent in China. The 1997-
1999 issues of China Securities Regulatory Commission Official Bulletin
contain reports of at least seven serious cases of market manipulation.'
2
Market manipulations typically occur as follows: a corporate entity opens a
number of accounts under different aliases; next, it subscribes for a large
number of shares in a company; finally, the shares are sold from one account
to another, thereby artificially raising the stock's turnover and share price.
In each case reported in the 1997-99 Official Bulletin, manipulation
activities were coupled with insider trading activities. When the price of the
manipulated shares was raised to a certain level, those involved would sell
their shares and reap huge profits. However, once the manipulators sold
their shares, the price of the stock would plummet, resulting in significant
losses for the uninformed investors.
Alternatively, a company can manipulate the price of its own shares
by forming an alliance with another company and trading on inside
" Senate Select Committee on Securities and Exchange, Australian Securities Markets and their
Regulation, Report (AGPS, Canberra, 1974), at 207, in ROMAN TOMASIC & STEPHEN BOTTOMLEY,
CORPORATIONS LAW IN AUSTRALIA 683 (1995).
12 See Decision of the China Securities Regulatory Commission ("CSRC") on the punishment of
Guangfa Securities Co. for breaching the securities law and regulations (June 11, 1997), 16 ZHENGJIAN
CHA ZI [CSRC OFFICIAL BULL.] 77 (Aug. 1997) (P.R.C.); CSRC's decision on the punishment of Shenyin
Wanguo Securities Co. Ltd. for breaching securities law and regulations (June 11, 1997), 17 ZHENGJIAN
CHA ZI [CSRC OFFICIAL BULL.] 79 (Aug. 1997) (P.R.C.); CSRC's decision on the punishment of Haitong
Securities Co. for breaching securities law and regulations (June 11, 1997), 18 ZHENGJIAN CHA ZI [CSRC
OFFICIAL BULL.] 81 (Aug. 1997) (P.R.C.); CSRC's decision on the punishment of Nanshan Fund
Management Co. for breaching securities law and regulations (June 11, 1997), 20 ZHENGJIAN CHA ZI
[CSRC OFFICIAL BULL.] 85 (Aug. 1997) (P.R.C.); CSRC's decision on the punishment of Hunan Huatian
Enterprise Group Co. and Shenzhen Weishen Securities Co. for breaching securities law and regulations
(Apr. 14, 1998), 21 ZHENGJIAN CHA ZI [CSRC OFFICIAL BULL.] 47 (Apr. 1998) (P.R.C.); CSRC's decision
on the punishment of Zhongyuan (Shanghai) Zhiye Development Co. Ltd. for breaching securities law and
regulations (Apr. 21, 1998), 23 ZHENGJIAN CHA ZI [CSRC OFFICIAL BULL.] 49 (Apr. 1998) (P.R.C.);
CSRC's decision on the punishment of Nanfang Securities Co. Ltd., Beida Chehang Co. Ltd. and other
institutions and individuals for breaching securities law and regulations (Oct. 7, 1999), 28 ZHENGJIAN CHA
ZI [CSRC OFFICIAL BULL.] 47 (Dec. 1999) (P.R.C.); CSRC's decision on the punishment of the
Constructive Group of Liaoning Province, Liaoning Jindi Construction Ltd. Group and Guangfa Securities
Co. Shanghai Office for breaching securities law and regulations (Oct. 11, 1999), 29 ZHENGJIAN CHA ZI
[CSRC OFFICIAL BULL.] 50 (Dec. 1999) (P.R.C.).
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information. In such situations the insiders profit at the expense of parties
who trade with them. In Nanfang Securities and Bei Da Che Hang13 the
issuing company Bei Da Che Hang ("BDCH") tipped Nanfang Securities, an
underwriter, about the impending allotment of newly issued shares to
existing holders at no charge. 14  The underwriter then acquired a large
number of BDCH shares. Through cooperation between Nanfang and
BDCH and a third party, the share price rose by almost 100% in the course
of the share allotment. At the conclusion of the operation, Nanfang sold all
their acquired shares, making a net profit of RMB 77,418,900 (about U.S.
$9,441,300), which was shared with Nanfang Securities and its holding
company Nanfang Group.
Insider trading associated with market manipulation and other forms
of abusive trading activities can have a damaging impact on a region's
economy. Indeed, the massive speculative double play by hedge fund
managers in Hong Kong in 1998 illustrates this phenomenon. Hedge fund
managers sold Hong Kong dollars heavily, then spread rumors in the market
that the Hong Kong dollar's fixed exchange rate with the U.S. dollar was
about to be abandoned. The purpose of this move was to force a defensive
interest rate hike. At the same time, the Hong Kong shares were sold short
on the assumption that the rate hike would force stock prices down. 5 Had
the hedge funds maneuver been successful, interest rates would have been
elevated to an artificial level, investments in the financial market would have
been diverted to other sectors of the economy, and share prices would have
been pushed down. This scheme would have enabled the manipulators to
make a fortune on using other people's money. Fortunately, the maneuver
was not successful because the Hong Kong government learned about the
plan and spent $23 billion over the course of eleven days on all 33 stocks in
the Hang Seng index to sustain the stock prices and force the retreat of the
fraudulent investors. 16
The techniques used by the hedge fund players included market
manipulation (by selling Hong Kong dollars heavily and spreading false
rumors), short selling, and insider trading. The information at issue in the
Hong Kong hedge fund scandal was inside information because the
13 Nanfang Securities & Bei Da Che Hang, 10 ZHENGJIAN CHA ZI [CSRC OFFICIAL BULL.] 47
(1999) (P.R.C.).
14 This practice is called "Song Gu" and is quite prevalent in China. The price of the shares will
often drop following a Son Gu, because Son Gu can be made from both company profits and the issuing
company's capital reserve. JIAREN JU, ZHENJUANFA WUsHt DAODu 350 TI [A SECURITIES LAW PRACTICE
GUIDE: 350 QUESTIONS] 133 (Beijing 1999).
15 Steve Burrell, The Man Who Saved Hong Kong, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Aug. 4, 2000, at 24.
16 id.
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managers' manipulation of the market was not public knowledge. Short
selling refers to "[t]he sale of a security that is not yet owned, in the
expectation that its price will fall so that it can be bought back later at a
profit."'17 For example, a fund manager may briefly borrow shares from an
investor for a fee to short-sell the shares. If the price of the shares falls after
the sale, the fund manager may buy the shares back and return them to the
lender so the manager makes a profit. 18
The trading volume and liquidity of China's financial market are both
very low, making China's market more susceptible to manipulation than the
markets in most other countries. State-owned securities, which account for
70% of the country's issued shares, are not negotiable in China's financial
markets for ideological reasons.' 9 Therefore, a prohibition against insider
trading, which is often associated with other forms of abusive activities such
as market manipulation and illegal short selling, bears particular relevance to
the protection of the financial market and investors' interests in China.
III. THE BACKGROUND OF CHINA'S INSIDER TRADING LAW
A. The Development of the Current Capital Markets
China's modem financial markets developed in the 1980s, following
the Communist Party's decision to transform the planned economy into a
socialist market economy. A form of the market economy emerged in the
rural sector after the third plenary session of the 11 th National Congress in
1978. Before 1978, the basic unit of the productive force was what was
called "team of production." A team, normally composed of rural villagers,
produced what the central government mandated. Since 1979, teams of
production 20 have been able to contract out tasks of production to individual
farmers. In general, privatization in the rural sector has helped to increase
"7 See Australian Financial Review Dictionary of Investment Terms, County Investment
Management, at http://www.county.com.au/web/webdict.nsf/pages/index.
18 See Barrie Dunstan, Retail Investors Can Sell Themselves Short, AUSTL. FIN. REV., Sept. 8, 2000,
available at 2000 WL 26256076.
9 If state-owned securities were negotiable in the market it would be possible to transfer the state-
owned securities to private hands. That would deviate from the constitutional provision that the means of
production is owned by the whole people, and the State. ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO XIANFA
[CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA] (adopted Dec. 4, 1982, amended Apr. 12, 1988,
Mar. 29, 1993, Mar. 15, 1999) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter P.R.C. CONST.], art. 6. In other words, negotiability of
state-owned securities will convert state-owned enterprises to private enterprises. This will turn -China
from a socialist country into a capitalist country. See F. Cao, Capital Reorganization for Enterprise and
Capital Market, in Zhongguo Ziben Shichang Fazhan De Lilun Yu Shijian [THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE
DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA'S CAPITAL MARKET] 141, 154 (Y. Li. et al. eds., Beijing 1998).
20 Teams of production were called "Cun," which means village.
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the efficiency of farming activities, which in turn, created a considerable
surplus of rural labor and encouraged the establishment of small
manufacturing business entities in the rural sector.
China was still largely a planned economy when the number of small
rural manufacturing businesses mushroomed. For this reason, it was nearly
impossible for these businesses to obtain loans from banks owned by the
State. This meant that there was a need for funding to enable these
businesses to operate. Consequently, funding was achieved by the issuance
of writs similar to debentures. This constituted the birth of the Chinese
securities markets and impacted the economic reform of the country on a
national scale. Prior to 1979, the primary source of state revenue was
government-collected taxes from state-owned enterprises. As a consequence
of economic reform, the level of funds collected by the government from the
state-owned enterprises dropped and the government issued bonds to make
up the taxation shortfall. 2 1 The government was still unable to finance state-
owned enterprises, and began requiring the companies to raise funds by
issuing shares and debentures.22 Furthermore, to meet the demand for
capital expansion and market liquidity, securities markets were established
in Shanghai in 1990 and Shenzhen in 1991.23
B. The Development of Insider Trading Law in China
Securities Trading in China has been supervised by a variety of
regulatory authorities. Before October 1992, securities trading activities
were mostly supervised by regulatory bodies at the provincial level.
Between October 1992 and the end of 1998, securities trading activities were
jointly supervised by local regulatory bodies and the China Securities
Regulatory Commission ("CSRC"), an instrumentality of the central
24government. Since August 1998, however, financial market activities have
been regulated exclusively by CSRC .
2 1. A. TOKLEY & TINA RAVN, COMPANY AND SECURITIES LAW IN CHINA 62 (1998).
22 See D. JIN, DANGDAI ZHONGGUO ZHENGQUAN SHICHANG [CONTEMPORARY SECURITIES MARKET
OF CHINA) 21-23 (Shanghai 1999).
23 TOKLEY & RAVN, supra note 21, at 63.
24 CSRC is a branch of the State Council. Prior to August 1998, China's securities industry
supervisory body was the Securities Commission under the State Council. CSRC was under the leadership
of the Securities Commission. In August 1998, the State Council was restructured and CSRC became
China's securities industry supervisory body.
21 CHINA SECURITIES REGULATION COMMISSION, SECURITIES PROFESSIONALS ADMISSION
EXAMINATION COMMITTEE, ZHENGQUAN SHICHANG JICHU ZHISHI [BASIC KNOWLEDGE ABOUT SECURITIES
MARKET] 320-21 (Shanghai 1999) [hereinafter BASIC KNOWLEDGE].
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Before October 1992, local regulatory authorities promulgated various
rules prohibiting abusive activities in China's financial markets. These rules
contained provisions against insider trading, such as Articles 37, 39, 40 of
Measures for Regulating Securities Trading in Shanghai (1990)26 and
Article 43(4) of Tentative Measures for Regulating Securities Issuance and
Trading in Shenzhen (1991) 21 In 1993, the State Council's Securities
Commission promulgated the Tentative Measures against Securities Fraud
("Tentative Measures") 28 The Tentative Measures contained more detailed
provisions against insider trading activities than had previously existed in
China.
The insider trading provisions in the Securities Law enacted in 1998 are
almost identical to the provisions in the Tentative Measures. The only
noteworthy difference, is that under the Securities Law, the State Council's
securities regulatory bodies have the authority to determine which type of
information amounts to inside information, aside from what is enumerated
under Articles 62(2) and 69, and it grants exclusive regulatory authority
given to the CSRC.
IV. THE INSIDER TRADING PROVISIONS OF THE SECURITIES LAW
A. Legislative Objectives of China's Insider Trading Law
The primary purpose of China's insider trading law is to protect
investor's interests and ensure the stability of the financial market. Article 1
of the Securities Law states that the Law is formulated in order to
standardize the issuing and trading of securities, to protect the lawful rights
and interests of investors, to safeguard the social and economic order and the
public interest, and to promote the development of the socialist market
economy. According to the Finance and Economics Committee of the
National People's Congress, the most "direct" purpose of the Securities Law
is the protection of investors' interests. In a securities regulatory affairs
meeting, Chen Yaoxian, Vice Chairman of CSRC, noted that the ultimate
purposes of the securities regulation were to ensure the stability of the
financial market, safeguard the market order and public interests, and protect
26 Shanghaishi Zhengquan Jiaoyi Guanli Banfa [Measures for Regulating Securities Trading in
Shanghai] (Nov. 27, 1990) (P.R.C.).
' Shenzhen Gupiao Shichang De Yunzuo Yu Guanli [Tentative Measures for Regulating Securities
Issuance and Trading in Shenzhen] (May 15, 1991) (P.R.C.).
28 Jinzhi Zhengquan Qizha Xingwei Zanxing Banfa [Tentative Measures against Securities Fraud]
(Aug. 15, 1993) (P.R.C.).
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investors. 29  The efficacy of China's insider trading provisions hinges on
whether it can facilitate the achievement of this purpose.
B. Prohibited Acts Under China's Insider Trading Law
Article 67 of the Securities Law prohibits informed persons with
inside information about securities to use such inside information in carrying
out securities trading. However, Article 68 and Article 69 curb the broad
nature of this regulation. These provisions limit the scope of prohibited
activities by providing a restrictive interpretation of the terms "informed
persons" and "inside information."
1. "Informed Persons"
Under Article 68, only certain types of persons are considered
"informed persons." They include:
(1) Senior officials of an issuing company;
(2) Shareholders who own 5% or more stock in the
issuing company;
(3) Senior officials of the holding company of the issuing
body;
(4) Persons who are able to obtain material company
information concerning the trading of its securities by
virtue of their positions in the company;
(5) Employees of the securities regulatory authorities and
other persons with statutory duties pertaining to the
regulation of securities trading;
(6) Employees of intermediary organizations that participate
in securities trading pursuant to their statutory duties,
employees of securities registration and/or clearance
institutions, and securities trading service organizations;
and
(7) Other persons specified by the State Council's securities
regulatory authority.30
29 See Chen Yaoxian Zai Quanguo Zhengquan Jianguan Gongzuo Huiyi Shang Yaoqiu Zhuanbian
Guannian, Zhuanhuan Zhize, Ba Zhengquan Gongzuo De Zhongdian Zhuanyi Dao Jianguan Shanglai,
[Chen Yaoxian Wants a Change of Ideology, a Change of Responsibilities and that the Focus of Securities
(Regulatory) Work Be Shifted to (Securities) Supervision in the National Securities and Futures Regulation
Meeting] (Jan. 24, 1998), 1 ZHENGJIAN CHA ZI [CSRC OFFICIAL BULL.] 48 (1999) (P.R.C.).
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This restrictive interpretation of "informed persons" severely limits
the utility of the insider trading law. Article 68 allows insider trading
activities to be carried out by many individuals who may have inside
information. Moreover, the types of people listed under Article 68 may not
always be in possession of inside information.
a. The types of insiders whom the Securities Law fails to catch
Article 68 fails to prohibit two types of people who possess inside
information from engaging in insider trading: people who actually possess
inside information but are not specifically listed under Article 68, and tipees
of inside information.
1) Insiders who are not treated as "informed persons" under
Article 68
The types of people who are deemed to be "informed persons" under
Article 68 are individuals connected with the issuing company, employees of
securities regulatory bodies, and employees of the securities service
industry. However, people not included in Article 68 can often be privy to
non-public material information. This class of persons can be illustrated by
discussing two American cases. The first case is Chiarella v United States.
3 1
Chiarella was an employee of a financial printer that generated corporate
documents. Chiarella traded on confidential, non-public information that he
obtained by virtue of his status as an employee, making a profit of $30,000.
The Second Circuit upheld Chiarella's conviction for breaching Section
10(b) of the Federal Securities Exchange Act and Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") Rule IOb-5.32
The Supreme Court of the United States, however, reversed the
decision. The Supreme Court held that Chiarella was not a fiduciary of the
issuing company and that trading on inside information by a person who is
not a fiduciary of the issuing body does not amount to fraud under Section
10(b).33 The theoretical basis the Chiarella court adopted is known as the
"breach of fiduciary duty theory." One might pause here to observe that if
the American insider trading law does not prohibit a person in Chiarella's
30 Securities Law, supra note 1, art. 68.
31 United States v. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
32 Id. at 224-25.
" Id. at 234-35.
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position from trading, why should China's law do this? The answer to this
question is that the fiduciary duty theory has been superceded by the so-
called "misappropriation theory," which was adopted in 1997 by the U.S.
Supreme Court in United States v. 0 Hagan.
34
In O'Hagan, the defendant was a partner of a law firm that was
retained in connection with a proposed corporate takeover. The defendant,
who was not directly representing the firm's client, learned confidential
details about the proposed deal from another partner. Based on this inside
information, the defendant purchased 2,500 call options and 5,000 shares of
common stock from the target company. When the tender was made public,
the defendant sold his stock and call options, making a profit in excess of
U.S. $4.3 million dollars. The Supreme Court held that a person violates
Section 10(b) when the person (who deceptively misappropriates
confidential information for securities trading purposes) is in breach of a
fiduciary duty owed to the source of the information (as distinct from a
fiduciary duty owed to the issuing company).35 Presumably, had Chiarella
been heard after O'Hagan, the Court would have applied the
misappropriation theory in light of the facts of that case.
China's current insider trading law would not apply in either the
Chiarella or O'Hagan scenarios. Neither Chiarella nor O'Hagan were
officials or employees of the issuing company in question. Nor do they fall
into any other category of "informed persons" defined under Article 68.
Therefore, neither Articles 67 nor Article 68 could be employed in similar
insider trading. prosecutions in China.
2) Tipees
Tipees are not considered informed persons under China's Securities
Law. Article 70 of the Securities Law prohibits an "informed person" or
"other person who has illegally obtained inside information" from
communicating inside information to others or procuring others to trade on
such information. However, Article 70 does not prohibit a tipee from
trading on the inside information himself. This is because a tipee is not
treated as an informed insider under Article 68. Moreover, a tipee cannot be
34 United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
3s The Court stated, "We agree with the Government that misappropriation, as just defined, satisfies
§10(b)'s requirement that chargeable conduct involves a 'deceptive device or contrivance' used 'in
connection with' the purchase or sale of securities." Id. at 653. Furthermore, the Court held, "The
misappropriation theory comports with § 10(b)'s language, which requires deception 'in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security,' not deception of an identifiable purchaser or seller. The theory is also
well tuned to an animating purpose of the Exchange Act ..... Id. at 658.
MARCH 2001
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
a "person who has illegally obtained insider information" under Article 70.36
The failure to treat a tipee as an informed insider renders Articles 68 and 70
illusory since the types of persons listed under Article 68 can always
communicate inside information to a relative or a friend. The relative or
friend can then trade on the information for him or herself or even trade on
behalf of the tipee.
b. Persons who are deemed to be insiders but do not actually possess
inside information
Another problem is that the Securities Law considers many people to
be "in possession" of inside information even when they do not actually
possess such information. For example, it seems unfair to say that all
employees of the securities regulating bodies possess inside information,
nevertheless they appear to possess such information under Articles 62 and
69. In addition, senior officials of a company may not always be aware of
every dealing that is considered inside information. For example, if the
senior official is trading, but is unaware of a change in the amount of shares
owned by a major shareholder or is unaware of a major mortgage, sale, or
write-off, that official is in danger of being charged with insider trading
violations.
Additionally, a shareholder who happens to hold five percent or more
of the company's stock can inadvertently violate the Securities Law when
the company does not have a duty to communicate every piece of inside
information to him or her. Consider this scenario: Abel, a shareholder who
held five percent of a company's stock was not aware of the company's
default on a major purchase. Abel sells half of his shares for personal
reasons before the company's poor quarterly earnings report are made
public. At the discretion of CSRC, a Securities Law action can be brought
against Abel. This is because he is considered an insider under Articles
68(2), and has traded on a type of 'inside information' listed under 62(4),
which is prohibited by Articles 67 and 70. Additionally, the Securities Law
does not provide Abel with any possible defenses to such a charge of insider
trading.
36 Securities Law, supra note 1, art. 70.
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2. "Inside Information"
Articles 62 and 69 of China's Securities Law determine what
constitutes "inside information." Article 69 lists the "major events: that a
company is required to disclose to the regulatory authority under Article 62,
as well as a range of other types of information deemed to be "inside
information." The following qualify as 'major events' under Article 62:
(1) A major change in the company's business policies or
scope of business;
(2) A decision by the company concerning a major
investment or major asset purchase;
(3) The company concludes a major contract potentially
effecting the company's assets, liabilities, rights, interests
or business results;
(4) The company incurs a major debt or defaults on a major
debt;
(5) The company incurs a major deficit, or a major loss
exceeding ten percent of the company's net assets;
(6) A major change in the external production or business
conditions of the company;
(7) A change in the chairman of the board, or not less than
one-third of the directors or managers of the company;
(8) A relatively major change in the ownership share of a
shareholder who holds not less than five percent of the
company's shares;
(9) A decision to reduce the company's capital, to merge, to
divide or dissolve the company, or to file for bankruptcy;
(10) Major litigation involving the company where the court
decides to lawfully revoke resolutions made at a
shareholders' general meeting or by the board of
directors; or
(11) Other events specified in laws or administrative
regulations.
37
The following information is regarded as "inside information" under Article.
69:
17 Id. art. 62.
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(1) The major events described in the second paragraph of
Article 62 of the Securities Law;
(2) Company plans concerning distribution of dividends or
increases of registered capital;
(3) Major changes in the company's equity structure;
(4) Major changes in security for the company's debts;
(5) Any single mortgage, sale or write-off of not more than
thirty percent of a major asset used in the business of the
company;
(6) Potential liability for major damages to be assumed as a
result of an act committed by a company's director(s),
supervisor(s), manager(s), deputy manager(s) or other
senior management personnel;
(7) Plans concerning the takeover of listed companies; and
(8) Other important information determined by the State
Council's securities regulatory authority to have a
significant or measurable effect on securities trading
38prices.
Like the definition of "informed persons," the definition of "inside
information" under Articles 62 and 69 renders the insider trading provisions
largely ineffective. The reason for this is that the provisions fail to treat the
most typical forms of inside information as inside information. Consider the
following example:
On April 1, the research scientists of X Drug Company inform
the president of the company that they have discovered a cheap
way of.manufacturing "intervention," a substance thought to be
effective in fighting cancer. The president realizes that if news
of the discovery is released, the price of X stock will skyrocket
from its current price of U.S. $30 per share. Instead of issuing
a press release, the president keeps the good news under wraps
while he buys as much X Stock as he can at the current market
price. On April 15, he finally allows a press release to be
issued. Upon the release, the market price of X stock
immediately jumps to U.S. $100 and several days later the
president sells his shares at the inflated price.
39
38 Id. art. 69.
39 ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 264 (1986).
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This "good news" situation, which is one of the most common insider
trading scenarios, is not considered "inside information" under Articles 62
and 69. Therefore, the president in this example would not have engaged in
insider trading activities under the Chinese Securities Law.
Front-running is another common form of insider trading that is not
addressed in Articles 62 and 69. Front-running occurs when a broker/dealer,
who knows a client has a large or market-sensitive order, engages in a
transaction on his, her or another client's behalf, thereby benefiting from the
pre-waming. 40 In other words, front-runners possess material information
that a client has placed an order that will affect the market price of the shares
to be transacted. This form of insider trading can occur when either shares
or derivatives are traded,4 1 as well as in the related instruments market.42
Front-running is said to be an industry-wide problem and not specific to a
region or a particular country.43 Thus, there is reason to conjecture that
front-running is among the most common and lucrative forms of insider
trading engaged in by institutional investors.
Front-running is particularly relevant to large-scale fund managers,
such as American owned Fidelity, which manage assets worth hundreds of
billions of dollars.44 Therefore, any large-scale securities purchase by such
managers is likely to increase the price of the security, simply by virtue of
the trading volume. Individual fund managers can make huge profits by
trading ahead of the purchase. Some managers trade ahead for their own
accounts as many as 500 times a year with an annual profit of U.S. $2.5 to 3
million.45
Scalping activities are another category of insider trading activity not
considered to yield inside information under the Securities Law:
Scalping is the practice of effecting a personal transaction of the
fiduciary before effecting transactions in the same or related
properties for the beneficiary, followed by further personal
transactions to profit from the resultant market activity. One
simple example is for the manager to acquire a sizeable position
40 Australian Stock Exchange Ltd., Circular to Member Organizations (June 21 1990).
4 NICK BATrELY, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMMODITY FUTURES AND OPTIONS 100-01 (2d ed. 1995).
42 Australian Stock Exchange Ltd., supra note 40.
43 B. Carvalho, India. Frontrunning is No Fair Race, BUS. WORLD, Sept. 6, 1998, available at
REUTERS BUSINESS BRIEF, http://www.briefing.reuters.com.
44 Garth Alexander, U.S.A.: Fidelity Denies Probe in Insider Trading, SUNDAY TIMES (UK), Apr.
21, 1996, available at REUTERS BUSINESS BRIEFING, http://www.briefing.reuters.com.
45 Id.
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of an obscure stock on the stock exchange, then direct the
trustee to invest in such stock. The manager then sells in the
market-presumably at a higher price as a result of the
acquisition activities of the trustee.46
The material information the fund manager possesses in this scenario is that
the price of the junk stock will be raised because of the trustee's purchase.
While this activity has the same effect as other prohibited activities, it is not
expressly forbidden by Articles 62 and 69.
3. CSRC's Interpretive Power Does Not Solve the Security Law's
Problems
CSCR's interpretive power does not solve the Security Law's
problems because the CSRC seldom uses this power to broaden the coverage
of the insider trading laws. The narrow definitions of "insider" and "inside
information" significantly curb the scope and potential effectiveness of the
insider trading provisions of the Securities Law. However, the Securities
Law contains additional provisions that could theoretically broaden the
scope of the insider trading provisions. Articles 68(7) and 69(8) give
discretionary power to the State Council's securities regulatory authority to
identify "informed persons" and "inside information" not explicitly defined
in Articles 68 and 69. Parliament intended these provisions to fill gaps not
covered by the illustrative lists of Articles 68 and 69. If CSRC routinely
exercised the interpretive power of Articles 68(7) and 69(8), these two sub-
articles would remedy the deficiencies of the insider trading provisions.
However, the CSRC seldom uses this power. A review of the insider trading
cases reported in CSRC Official Bulletin47 demonstrates that CSRC has
rarely, if ever, exercised its interpretive power.
Additionally, CSRC decisions are difficult to effectively appeal
because the appeals process does not flow through the proper legal channels.
Under the Regulations of Administrative Reconsideration ("RAR"), an
"administrative reconsideration" is normally conducted by the supervising
body of the decision-maker.48 When an aggrieved party is dissatisfied with
the review of an administrative decision, he or she is able to have the
administrative reconsideration reviewed by a court, assuming that such
46 KAM FAN SIN, THE LEGAL NATURE OF UNIT TRUST 200 (1997).
47 This includes cases reported in ZHENGJIAN CHA ZI [CSRC OFFICIAL BULL.] up to March 2000.
48 See Xingzheng Fuyi Tiaoli, [Regulations on Administration Reconsideration] (amended Oct. 9,
1994), arts. 11-22 (P.R.C.)
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review is permitted by the law in question.49 Article 210 of the Securities
Law provides:
If a person concerned is dissatisfied with a punishment decision
of the securities regulatory authority, or the department
authorized by the State Council, such person may apply for
review or directly institute proceedings in a people's court
according to law.
The securities regulatory authority in this context is the CSRC, which
is a government instrumentality under the direct supervision of the State
Council. 50 The appropriate review body of CSRC's decisions should
therefore be the State Council's Legal Affairs Office. Thus, under Article
210, a person aggrieved by a CSRC decision has two avenues of appeal.
First, the person can seek to have a CSRC decision reviewed by the State
Council's Legal Affairs office. If the person is not satisfied with the
outcome of the State Council's review, he or she may request a review by a
court of law. Second, the person can seek to have CSRC's decision directly
reviewed by a court of law.
The problem is that in practice, an appeal to the State Council's Legal
Affairs Office is not available because the CSRC conducts administrative
appeals of its own decisions. A CSRC punishment decision typically ends
with a sentence stating that if the defaulting party is dissatisfied with
CSRC's decision, the defaulting party should seek administrative
reconsideration by CSRC within 15 days of the announcement of the
decision, or initiate an administrative litigation proceeding in a court of law,
with proper jurisdiction, within three months of the decision.5 1
In summary, the problems with the narrow scope of the insider trading
laws are not solved by the interpretive powers granted to the CSRC. The
CSRC seldom exercises its discretion to broaden the definitions of "insider"
or "insider information." Moreover, CSRC decisions are difficult to
effectively appeal because the appeals process does not flow through the
proper legal channels.
49 A person aggrieved by various types of administrative decision is able to seek judicial review of
the administrative decision in question. Decisions of a body that conducts administrative considerations are
also subject to judicial review. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susongfa [The People's
Republic of China Administrative Litigation Law] (enacted Apr. 4, 1989), arts. l1, 25 (P.R.C.).
so BASIC KNOWLEDGE, supra note 25, at 320-22.
51 See, e.g., CSRC's decision on the punishment of Fujian Xingye Securities Co. for breaching
securities law and regulations (Mar. 31, 2000), 23 ZHENGJIAN CHA Z1 [CSRC OFFICIAL BULL.] (2000), at
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/ (last visited Sept. 14, 2000).
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C. Liabilities for Engaging in Insider Trading Activities
The liability scheme of the Securities Law is contained in Article 183.
Under this Article, a person who breaches insider trading provisions must
52dispose of the illegally obtained securities. The profit made by virtue of
the breach must be confiscated. In addition, the person is fined an amount
that is (1) greater than or equal to the amount of the illegally obtained
income, but less than five times the amount of the illegal income, or (2) less
than the value of the securities illegally purchased or sold. If the matter
constitutes a criminal offense, criminal liability must be pursued according
to law.
53
Article 183 does not achieve the legislative purpose of the Securities
Law because it does not instill a sense of investor protection, it does not
afford alleged offenders fair treatment, and it is difficult to implement.
1. The Efficacy of Article 183
In Chinese law, conduct that is in breach of a legislative provision is
considered a crime only if it violates the Criminal Code. 54 As discussed
above, insider trading is penalized by imposing fines and confiscating profits
made through insider trading activities. The State Council's securities
regulatory authority, instead of the courts, deals with all breaches of the
Securities Law under Article 167(7). Therefore, insider trading liability
under the Securities Law is an "administrative penalty" and is not a criminal
offense.55
An administrative penalty regime, however, does not help achieve the
legislative purpose of the insider trading provisions. An administrative
penalty regime largely immunizes inside traders from criminal prosecution
and civil liability. The provision stating that a suspect can be criminally
liable if the insider trading conduct constitutes a crime has limited practical
value. Neither the Securities Law nor the Criminal Code define the type of
prohibited conduct that constitutes a criminal offense. To clarify such an
undefined concept in a statute, it is important to refer to the judicial
interpretations issued by the Supreme People's Court or the Supreme
52 Securities Law, supra note 1, art. 183.
53 Id.
54 Wu, Z., FAXOEGAILUN [AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW] 171-72 (Beijing 1994).
55 An administrative penalty is imposed by the State on a person who has breached a law other than
the Criminal Law. Such a penalty is imposed by an administrative body rather than a court. XINGZHENG
FA [ADMINISTRATIVE LAW] 205-07 (L. Wang & S. Zhang eds., Beijing 1993).
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56People's Procuratorate. However, there have been no judicial
interpretations issued as to what type of trading conduct constitutes a crime.
Further, there have never been any criminal prosecutions for engaging in
insider trading or market manipulation activities in China.57 Such a failure
to criminalize insider trading seriously limits the deterrent effect of the
insider trading provision under the Securities Law.
Additionally, investors' interests are not protected by civil law.
Article 183 fails to make those who violate the Securities Law liable to
victim-investors for monetary compensation. A person whose interests are
injured by insider trading activities is thus left without a remedy under the
Securities Law. Moreover, it is unlikely that a victim of insider trading will
be compensated under tort law. Deceit is not a cause of action under
Chinese tort law. The only possible source of a remedy in tort appears in
Article 117 of the General Principles of the Civil Law of the People's
Republic of China. Article 117 states that "[a]nyone who encroaches on the
property of the state, a collective or another person shall return the property;
failing that, he shall reimburse its estimated price." However, it would be
difficult, if not impossible, to prove that an insider trader encroached on the
property of a victim investor, given the impersonal nature of the securities
market.
An administrative penalty imposed under Article 183 benefits only the
government. All income from the fines and confiscation go directly to the
Chinese Government instead of the victim-investors. Moreover, all victim-
investors are left without compensation for their damages under the current
administrative penalty regime.
2. The Treatment of Alleged Offenders.
The treatment of alleged offenders under Article 183 is likely
unconstitutional and violates the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
("UDHR") and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
("ICCPR").58 The administrative penalty prescribed under Article 183 not
56 D. Zhou, A Review of New China's Judicial Interpretation and Reflections on the Perfection of
Judicial Interpretation, in A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF THE JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS BY THE SUPREME
PEOPLE'S COURT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1, 8 (Beijing 1994).57 Telephone Interview with Song Yongxin, Associate Professor, Zhejiang University Faculty of
Law (Aug. 2, 2000); Telephone Interview with Dr Lu Yiping, Senior Judge, Shen Zhen Intermediate
People's Court (Sept. 5, 2000).
58 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess. at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948) (adopted Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR], available at http://www.un.org/
Overview/rights.html.; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 12(4), 21 U.N. GAOR
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only fails to protect investors but also fails to treat the alleged insider trading
offenders fairly. An administrative penalty can be in the form of, inter alia,
a fine, or detention. 59 Therefore, it may involve an invasion of a person's
basic rights guaranteed under the Constitution of the People's Republic of
China. These Constitutional rights include those given by Article 13,
concerning property rights, and Article 37, guaranteeing the right to
liberty.6 °
The imposition of these penalties without a public trial amounts to a
breach of Article 11 of the UDHR, which provides that "(e)veryone charged
with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved
guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the
guarantees necessary for his defense." 61 Thus, under Article 11, a person
suspected violating the Securities Law is entitled to a public trial and should
be presumed innocent.
The monetary penalties imposed under Article 183 most likely violate
equal protection. Article 7 of the UDHR and Article 26 of the ICCPR,
guarantee that equal protection be accorded to all people. The monetary
penalty imposed under Article 183 is identical to that imposed under Article
180 of the Criminal Code. 62  However, the procedures for determining
whether there is civil liability or criminal liability are different. To establish
civil liability in common law jurisdictions, the court need only be satisfied
on the balance of probabilities; whereas the standard of proof for criminal
Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976). China has signed both,
but has not ratified either document.
59 Thus, administrative penalties are considered penal offenses. In China, a penal offense does not
have to be a criminal offence, since only breaches of China's Criminal Code with serious consequences are
treated as crimes. This scheme is not unique to China. Certain provisions in Australia's Corporation's Law
also have "Civil Penalty Provisions." A prima facie breach of such a provision may not constitute a
criminal offence, but will attract penal consequence in the form of a fine.
60 The Constitution provides that the state protects private individuals' ownership of lawful property.
PRC CONST., supra note 19, art. 13. Article 37 of the Constitution provides: "Freedom of the person of
citizens of the People's Republic of China is inviolable. No citizens may be arrested except with the
approval or by decision of a people's procuratorate or by decision of a people's court, and arrests must be
made by a public security organ. Unlawful detention or deprivation or restriction of citizens' freedom of
the person by other means is prohibited, and unlawful search of the person of citizens is prohibited." PRC
CONST., supra note 19, art. 37.
61 UDHR, supra note 58, art. II (emphasis added).
62 However, insider trading is also punishable by imprisonment. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo
Xingfa [Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China] (adopted by the Second Session of the Fifth
National People's Congress, July 1, 1979, amended by the Fifth Session of the Eighth National People's
Congress, Mar. 14, 1997) art. 180 (P.R.C.), translated in http://www.qis.net/chinalaw/ prclaw60.htm. In
China, a prima facie breach of the Criminal Law is not regarded as a crime unless the breach causes serious
consequences. Id. art. 13. For this reason, the Securities Law provides that if the matter constitutes a
criminal offence, criminal liability shall be pursued according to law. Securities Law, supra note 1, art.
183.
INSIDER TRADING IN CHINA
liability is beyond reasonable doubt. It is contrary to Article 7 of the UDHR
and Article 26 of the ICCPR to provide different standards of proof.
63
While domestic Chinese laws that contravene international human
rights law have not yet caused any practical problems for China's legislators
and courts, this situation is likely to change. China's entry into the WTO
opens the country's financial market to overseas investors. Subjecting
overseas investors to a law that violates international human rights laws may
lead to legal challenges and a loss of foreign investment.
3. The Practical Problems with Implementing Article 183.
The problems with implementing Article 183 relate to the following
requirement: "(i)n addition, a fine of not less than the amount of, and not
more than five times the illegal income, or a fine of not more than the value
of the securities illegally purchased or sold, shall be imposed."
64
Essentially, to make an order pursuant to this Article, CSRC will need to
make a choice between:
(1) A fine of not less than the amount of, and not more than
five times, the illegal income; and
(2) A fine of not more than the value of the securities
purchased or sold.
In practice, choice one mainly applies to traders of good news because
traders on bad news do not typically make a profit. Most insiders who trade
on bad news do so to avoid loss. 65  Choice two penalizes both traders of
good news and traders of bad news. Therefore, traders of good news can be
penalized under either option. Article 183 does not give any guidance as to
which choice applies in a situation where an insider trades on good news.
Furthermore, it does not clarify whether the basis for calculating the
monetary penalty should be determined by the value of shares before or after
the trading.
63 This situation may soon change because an evidence law is currently being drafted. Interview
with Professor Chen Guiming, Professor of Law, China University of Political Science and Law, in Gold
Coast, Australia (Aug. 24, 2000); Dr. Lu Yiping, supra note 57.
64 Securities Law, supra note 1, art. 183.
65 However, profits can be made by trading short on bad news. For example, an insider who trades
short would borrow a large number of shares from somebody else, sell them prior to the release of the bad
news, purchase them back when the price drops from the bad news, and return the lender's shares. The
profit made by the insider in such a situation is the difference between the share price prior to and
subsequent to the release of the bad news.
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This lack of guidance will certainly cause problems, as the following
example illustrates. Ian purchases 10,000 shares with $10,000 before the
release of a piece of good news. Ian sells the shares after the announcement
of the news at a price of $1.50 per share, realizing a $5,000 profit. If the
"value of securities" refers to the value of the securities before the trading,
then under choice two, Ian can be fined up to $10,000. If, however, the
value of securities after the transaction is adopted as a basis of calculation,
Ian will be liable for a fine of up to $15,000. Further, under choice one, the
size of the fine could be as high as $25,000. Because of the large disparity
in fines that can be imposed under choices one and two, the feasibility of
imposing Article 183 penalties is in serious question. This lack of
uniformity, together with the narrow interpretation of who is covered by the
insider trading provisions reduces their efficacy.
V. REFORM PROPOSAL
A. China's Definition of "Insider" Should Be Repealed in Favor of
Australia 's "Access to Information " Definition
China's closed-ended definition of "informed person" is inappropriate
because the targeted "insiders" may not possess inside information and
persons falling outside of the definition may actually have inside
information. To remedy this situation, China should adopt Australia's
"access of information" approach, embodied in section 1002G of Australia's
66Corporations Law.
Under section 1002G, a person is prohibited from trading on
information when the person possesses information that is not generally
available, and, if the information were generally available, a reasonable
person would know, or should know that the information would have a
material effect on the value of a company's stock. Under this approach,
individuals who are not explicitly mentioned in Article 68 of the Securities
Law but who are in possession of inside information, such as the
perpetrators in Chiarella and O'Hagan, as well as their tipees, would be in
breach of the insider trading law. Additionally, people deemed insiders but
who do not possess any inside information would not be subject to legal
actions.
6 Corporations Law, § 1002G (AustI.), in AUSTRALIAN CORPORATIONS LEGISLATION 1059
(Butterworths 2000).
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B. The Securities Law's "Inside Information" Definition Should Be
Based on the "Materiality " of the Information Possessed
The closed-ended definition of "inside information" contained in
Article 69 cannot cover all conceivable types of inside information. On this
point, Australia's flexible approach to the definition of "inside information"
is more commendable. Section 1002G of Australia's Corporations Law
prohibits an insider from trading on "material" non-public information.
Section 1002C explains "material effect" as a situation in which:
[a] person would be taken to expect information to have a
material effect on the price or value of securities of a body
corporate if the information would, or would be likely to,
influence persons who commonly invest in securities in
deciding whether or not to subscribe for, buy or sell the first-
67mentioned securities.
This broader definition of materiality is capable of capturing additional
forms of insider trading, since material non-public information capable of
affecting the price of the security in question is the only standard. Insiders
do not gain any advantage by trading on non-public information that does
not affect the change of price of the security.
It is advisable for China's legislators to consider adopting the
Australian approach, by enacting provisions that prohibit a person who is in
possession of non-public material information from trading. Defining inside
information as non-public material information will prohibit a wider range
of insider trading. It will remedy the current situation by prohibiting people
who are in possession of non-public material information, but are not listed
in Articles 62 and 69, such as front-runners, people who are involved in
scalping practices, and tipees from trading on the information they possess.
C. China Should Abandon Administrative Enforcement of the Securities
Law
Ideally, China should abandon the notion and practice of the
administrative penalty in its insider trading laws. The rationale behind the
existence of the administrative penalty regime is likely that it is more
expedient to govern without going through due process for every penalty
67 Id. § 1002C.
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imposed by the state. 68  This view is based on the assumption that an
administrative penalty regime is less costly then a legal penalty regime.
However, this may not be the case, as judicial officers in China are not
necessarily better remunerated than administrators.69 Instead, China would
likely spend roughly the same amount of money accomplishing the same
task without violating due process. Moreover, the administrative and
criminal penalty divide will likely not survive China's entry to the WTO.
Therefore, China should abandon the practice of utilizing administrative
penalties for insider trading violations.
In the alternative, the courts should be given the power to determine
who are insiders and what constitutes inside information, and the appropriate
appellate review of CRSC decisions should be enforced. Article 210 should
explicitly state that the CRSC may not review its own decisions. This would
provide meaningful review of CRSC decisions and thereby increase the
likelihood that the Securities Law will be fairly enforced.
D. Liabilities for Insider Trading Should Be Supplemented and Clarified
1. Additional Civil Remedies
To achieve the legislative purpose of the Securities Law, Article 183
should provide civil remedies for insider trading. For example, the Law
could give the CSRC and Chinese courts the power to order the perpetrator
to compensate innocent parties to the extent of their losses suffered.
CSRC should also be given the power to bring civil actions in the
name of, and for the benefit of, companies. This power is necessary in
situations where the company in question is unable to bring the action
because of financial restraints or where the company is reluctant to take
legal action against its own officers. CSRC should also be given a similar
power to bring a civil action on behalf of an individual whose interests are
hurt by the insider trading activities. This power is necessary for the public
interest in situations where the injured party lacks the financial means or
motivation to take legal action against the suspected insiders.
68 Dr. Lu Yiping observed that the rationale for the existence of the administrative penalty regime
was that it consumes too much time and resources if every unlawful act (as distinct from every criminal
conduct) needed to be dealt with by the judiciary. Dr. Lu Yiping, supra note 57.
69 Telephone Interview with Mr. Wu Jun, Managing Partner of Grand & Associates, Beijing (Oct. 8,
2000).
VOL. 10 No. 2
INSIDER TRADING IN CHINA
2. Clarification of Problems Associated with Implementing Article 183
There are two options regarding the imposition of the existing non-
civil penalties under Article 183. Clear guidance should be given as to the
amount of penalty that is to be imposed. A guiding principle may read,
"whichever is greater in value." Where a fine is provided, and the value of
the fine is to be determined by reference to the value of the securities traded,
the provision should state whether the value of the securities before or after
the trading is to be used as the basis for calculating the amount of penalty.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
A prohibition against insider trading is necessary in China for at least
two practical reasons. First, China is about to open its financial markets to
foreign investment. It will need to make investors feel confident about the
integrity of its financial markets to attract needed investment from overseas.
Second, insider trading can harm investors' interests and even the national
economy when it is associated with other forms of abusive trading activities,
such as market manipulation and short-selling. China should therefore
construct an insider trading regime for the purpose of protecting the interests
of market investors. Regrettably, the insider trading provisions under
China's first uniform Securities Law are incapable of achieving this purpose.
Given the narrow definitions of "informed person" and "inside information,"
the provisions are incapable of identifying and preventing many instances of
insider trading. Even if insider trading activity is identified, perpetrators do
not face criminal prosecution or civil liability under the current insider
trading law. Insider traders are only liable for paying administrative
penalties, the sole beneficiary of which is the Chinese government.
The reform proposals in Part IV are based on Australia's insider
trading law. The Australian approach supports a broader range of
prohibition than the American approach because the Australian approach
does not require the perpetrator to be a fiduciary to the source of information
in order to be liable for insider trading. This is a desirable approach because
trading on non-public material information by a non-fiduciary can be just as
harmful. 70 The fiduciary duty and misappropriation theories that have been
developed by the American courts in their interpretation of §10(b) of the
70 U.S. v. Cherif, 943 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1991). In Cherif the defendant convinced his girlfriend, a
bank employee, to write a fictitious memo enabling him access to the bank's financial department. The
defendant was not a fiduciary of the bank of the issuing companies. Id. However, the effect of his trading
would not have been different had he been a fiduciary.
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Securities Exchange Act of 1934 require the presence of a "deceptive device
or contrivance." However, in China, as in Australia, courts are not limited
by this constraint. Therefore, it is not necessary for China to adopt the
American fiduciary theories. The Australian approach is not based on
common law fiduciary principles and will therefore be easier for China to
adopt and to enforce.
